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Abstract
The market discipline of creditors on the risk-taking behaviour of borrowing banks 
represents a long-lasting debate. Such a debate gained new attention after the post-
crisis stream of reforms concerning resolution policy: creditors should be incentiv-
ized to make an optimal effort in monitoring their borrowers and, at the same time, 
their interests have been aligned with the social ones. Many commentators criticized 
such an expectation especially in the European context, arguing that the lack of 
credibility and excessive complexity of the resolution mechanism impair the ability 
and willingness of creditors to exert a disciplining role. This article aims at taking a 
step forward in this scientific debate, investigating whether the ability to exert disci-
plining activity is inherently impaired by the design of the Directive. In other words, 
this research wants to assess if, assuming an ideal environment, creditors would 
have optimal incentives to monitor banks’ behaviour and to react accordingly. To 
do so, the article reviews the literature on market discipline, then carries out a legal 
analysis of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD), focusing on those 
norms shaping the market for bail-inable securities. Eventually, the incentives stem-
ming from those norms are discussed, assuming an ideal environment where a bail-
in is certain and credible and the market for bail-inable securities works smoothly. 
The analysis highlights that the incentives of creditors toward market discipline are 
inherently diluted by the BRRD’s legal design because of competing policy objec-
tives pursued by the Directive. The direct normative consequence of such a finding 
is that enhancing information and predictability, though desirable in principle, will 
never lead to an optimal monitoring effort, leaving the floor to alternative rule-based 
strategies.
Keywords Law and finance · Bank resolution · Bail-inable creditors · Market 
discipline · ‘No creditor worse off’ rule
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1 Introduction
This article aims at assessing the role of creditors in imposing market discipline on 
the risk-taking behaviour of banking institutions. Regulators and academics have 
long since discussed the ability of junior creditors to correctly and continuously 
assess the risk profile of their borrowers, to promptly react to that information and, 
thus, to impact managerial behaviour.1 Nevertheless, the creation of the Banking 
Union and, more specifically, the implementation of the Bank Recovery and Res-
olution Directive (BRRD)2 have bestowed a new element in the market discipline 
debate in the banking sector.
An extensive amount of literature has highlighted the peculiar mechanisms of 
corporate governance in banks.3 In particular, the common wisdom in corporate 
governance, according to which maximizing shareholders’ value leads to socially 
optimal outcomes, has been questioned. In fact, the very nature of banking activity 
shifts this paradigm and generates incentives toward excessive risk-taking.4
In contrast, bondholders are, broadly speaking, interested in limiting the risk-
taking policies of their borrowers, so that the expected return on their investment 
increases. Therefore, in the banking sector, their incentives have been considered 
more aligned with the socially optimal outcome than the shareholders’ one. This 
contingency has been reinforced since the BRRD has been in place, at least accord-
ing to the policymaker.5 In fact, the policy goal of ending the ‘too big to fail’ prob-
lem led, among many other things, to the creation of a category of creditors whose 
claims can be written down to recapitalize distressed institutions, the so-called bail-
inable creditors. The resulting incentives for bail-inable creditors are expected to 
match the social objective which is to avoid, or at least to prevent and mitigate, bank 
distresses.6 The BRRD itself makes clear that a renewed push toward market disci-
pline represents a cornerstone of the regulatory architecture: ‘The bail-in tool will 
therefore give shareholders and creditors of institutions a stronger incentive to moni-
tor the health of an institution during normal circumstance’.7
Beyond these intuitive arguments, the ability of bail-inable creditors to influence 
managers’ risk-taking attitude represents an open and extensively discussed issue. 
Specifically, this article aims at tackling a narrower question: within the BRRD 
framework, are bail-inable creditors provided with appropriate incentives to engage 
1 BCBS (1999); Lane (1993).
2 Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014, establishing 
a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms [2014] OJ L 
173/190 (hereinafter, ‘BRRD’ or ‘the Directive’).
3 See, among many others, Becht et al. (2011).
4 Armour et al. (2016b).
5 Within the Euro Area, the Single Resolution Mechanisms Regulation (SRMR) [2014] OJ L225/1 disci-
plines the powers of resolution authorities. Nonetheless, since the resolution tools, the resolution objec-
tives and the conditions for resolution are identical in the BRRD and the SRMR, there is no need for a 
differentiation. This approach has been widely applied, see for instance Kunde (2015).
6 Zhou et al. (2012).
7 Recital 67 BRRD.
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in efficient monitoring? How do they differ from the previous regime? This repre-
sents more than a theoretical exercise, as the answer to this question has relevant 
consequences for the possibility of the new resolution framework to enhance, ex 
ante, the resilience of the banking system, thereby decreasing the risk-taking appe-
tite of financial institutions.
Many commentators have cast doubts on the actual ability of bail-inable creditors 
to discipline bankers. So far, the literature has only focused on impediments that 
are exogenous to creditors and prevent them from exerting market discipline. These 
impediments are mainly attributed to two factors: the lack of credibility of the bail-
in tool,8 and the high level of unpredictability stemming from the bail-in process.9
This article brings this debate a step further arguing that, even assuming a world 
of certainty and full predictability, the outcome in terms of creditors’ monitoring 
would not be efficient because of the legal design of the bail-in which, in turn, is 
ultimately rooted in the competing policy objective pursued by the Directive.10 In 
other words, the article will prove that the incentives for creditors to engage in moni-
toring activity are inherently diluted by the legal design of the BRRD.
The contribution to the current state of the literature is threefold. First, a detailed 
and comprehensive legal analysis of the rules shaping the market for bail-inable 
securities addressed through the eyes of the investors is currently lacking. Second, 
it builds a conceptual framework according to which ex ante decisions of creditors 
in term of monitoring can be analysed and partially explained. Finally, the article 
highlights the fact that the interplay of multiple policy objectives carried out by the 
new recovery and resolution framework entails unintended negative consequences.
The article is structured as follows: Sect. 2 defines market discipline in the con-
text of banks relying on the relevant economic theories and their regulatory implica-
tions. Section  3 discusses the post-crisis regulatory environment for the recovery 
and resolution of distressed banks in Europe, highlighting the impact that the new 
rules are expected to have on market discipline. Section 4 analyses the norms shap-
ing the legal status of bail-inable creditors, specifically pinpointing the different pol-
icy objectives that such rules stem from. Section 5 sets the necessary assumptions 
for an incentive analysis of the BRRD’s legal design and conceptualizes the rules on 
creditors’ treatment in terms of ex ante monitoring incentives. After the definition 
of the baseline incentive structure (Sect. 5.1), the analysis focuses on the impact of 
the ‘no creditor worse off’ rule (Sect. 5.2.1) and the rule on the possibility of grant-
ing public aid after the bail-in (Sect. 5.2.2), showing how they dilute the incentives 
toward the monitoring of investors; Sect. 5.3 provides anecdotal evidence support-
ing the findings of the research. Section 6 concludes.
8 Avgouleas and Goodhart (2015).
9 Tröger (2017).
10 Art. 31(2) BRRD.
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2  Market Discipline in Banking: A Review of Theories and Regulation
Market discipline is a complex and multifaceted concept. For the purpose of this 
article, the concept of market discipline is intended as the ability of investors in the 
financial market to influence the decision making of the companies they invest in by 
adjusting the price to the risk profile of the company.11 Price adjustment is not the 
only disciplining mechanism in banking, although it is the most prominent one. For 
instance, contractual clauses can have disciplining effects12 as well as debt govern-
ance through voice.13 Price adjustment, contracts and voice can be seen as comple-
mentary mechanisms; nonetheless, these latter mechanisms fall outside the scope of 
this article. In fact, discipline through price adjustment has been seen as the domi-
nant channel, especially in the policy discourse, as this section will show. More-
over, since these channels are complementary, focusing only on price adjustment 
and leaving aside the other channels, this does not hamper the overall argument.14
In its financial connotation, the underlying mechanisms on which the disciplin-
ing power of the market rely are the Efficient Market Hypothesis15 and the ability of 
prices to convey information.16
Nonetheless, in the context of financial institutions, market discipline is some-
thing different as well as being something more than the stock market monitoring of 
non-financial firms,17 even though these mechanisms share the same fundamental 
aspects. In fact, market discipline in financial institutions does not only cope with 
the efficiency of prices given the available information, but necessarily interplays 
with regulatory discipline in minimizing the threat to financial stability.18 Thus, it 
is not by chance that the literature, especially in the last three decades, has focused 
prominently on banking since the information produced can be used for supervisory 
purposes, potentially acting as a complement to prudential regulation.
Accordingly, Sironi defines market discipline as the ability of financial markets 
to discipline banks’ behaviour by pricing their borrowings according to their risk 
17 Holmstrom (2015).
18 Flannery and Bliss (2018).
11 Lane (1993), p 55 defined market discipline as the ability of financial markets to provide signals lead-
ing borrowers to engage in projects consistent with their solvency. Market discipline is not a bank-spe-
cific concept; indeed, many other examples where relevant actors need to be disciplined by the market 
have been pinpointed (Lane 1993, p 54). The clearest example is the disciplining effect of bankruptcy 
that imposes a budget constraint on the entrepreneur (Kornai 2001), shifting the control rights of the 
corporation to creditors, contingent on the event of default (Aghion and Bolton 1992). This optimizes, at 
least theoretically, the ex ante cost of finance (Schwartz 1998).
12 On the ability of financial contracting over bail-inable securities to discipline banks’ behaviours see 
Martino (2019).
13 This represents a heavily understudied aspect, especially in the European legal domain. For a general 
framework on that matter see Armour and Gordon (2014); Schwarcz (2016).
14 The complementarity between exit and voice in influencing decision making is well established in the 
literature, stemming from the seminal work by Hirschman (1970).
15 Fama (1970).
16 Grossman (1976).
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profile.19 Such a definition relies on two underlying assumptions, as pointed out and 
critically discussed by Bliss: first, bond yields’ spread reflects the risk of individual 
banks; second, the payoff matrices of debtholders and regulators closely resemble 
one another.20 The latter assumption involves the shape of the principal-agent con-
flicts at stake and so highly depends on both the institutional set-up and the type of 
debt instrument held by the investor. Therefore, when discussing the new regulatory 
framework, the arguments concerning its impact on market discipline are going to 
question whether such an assumption really holds true.
It is worth preliminarily noticing how, in the realm of banking, market discipline 
must be considered as a governance device, as it represents the means through which 
managers’ behaviour is impacted by creditors.21 Indeed, as Pacces and Heremans22 
pointed out: ‘all aspects of behaviour of financial firms can be ultimately understood 
as Corporate Governance issue’.23
Building on our working definition, the remainder of this section discusses the 
channels through which market discipline impacts on bankers’ behaviour, the con-
ditions for making market discipline effective and, finally, the different regulatory 
approaches toward market discipline and their evolution over time.
The economic literature has disentangled various aspects of market discipline and 
identified several conditions under which debt holders can effectively impinge upon 
bank governance. In particular, Kwast et al. disentangled a direct and indirect chan-
nel of influence.24 On the one hand, investors can directly push managers towards 
activities with a lower risk profile, thereby increasing the cost of funds for riskier 
banks. At the same time, the movement of market prices may indirectly attract the 
attention of supervisors, feeding them with new relevant information.25
For both the direct and indirect channel of discipline to effectively work, four key 
conditions need to be fulfilled.26 First, the relevant market has to be open and freely 
accessible to make interest rates sensitive to a borrower’s risk profile.27 Second, 
lenders need to have access to all relevant information about a borrower’s debt.28 
Third, crucially, market participants must have no bailout expectations. This con-
dition consists of two distinct aspects: the commitment of the government not to 
bailout a failing firm and the credibility that such a commitment generates toward 
19 Sironi (2003).
20 Bliss (2001).
21 On the agency conflict between shareholders and creditors and the peculiar shape it assumes in bank-
ing, where high leverage magnify the incentives to shift the risk to unsecured creditors, see extensively 
Becht et al. (2011), p 459.
22 Pacces and Heremans (2011), p 597.
23 Corporate governance has been defined as: ‘the ways in which supplies of finance assure themselves 
of getting a return on their investment’ (Shleifer and Vishny 1997).
24 Kwast et al. (1999).
25 Consistently with the motivation and the research goal of this paper, the direct channel is going to be 
the most considered; nonetheless, it is important to bear in mind that also the indirect disciplining chan-
nel works in the background.
26 On those conditions, see extensively Lane (1993).
27 See also Scott (2004).
28 Crockett (2002).
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the market. Finally, borrowers need to be able and willing to respond to the market 
signal and adjust their risk profile accordingly29 which, to an extent, represents the 
direct consequences of the other conditions. In fact, increasing the interest rate rep-
resents an efficient answer to risk-taking only up to a certain level of risk; beyond 
such a level the borrower runs out of funding opportunities and is out of the market. 
This latter prospect is by no means in line with safeguarding the solvency of the 
firm.30
Regarding the openness of the market, despite some specific and minor foreclo-
sures, the market has to be considered open so that no impediments to market disci-
pline arise from this perspective.31 On the contrary, the other three conditions raise 
delicate problems. In fact, the full availability of information is impaired by the very 
design of the commercial bank business model, given the maturity and liquidity 
mismatches of bank assets and liabilities.32 In fact, as for the second condition, the 
bank is better positioned than any other investors to monitor and screen the quality 
of its own assets because of their inherent opacity.33 This impairs the ability of bank 
creditors to impose efficient discipline on bank management; therefore, to alleviate 
such a problem, regulators imposed massive disclosure obligations on banks.
Also the third condition (i.e.: the lack of bailout expectations) has proven to be 
problematic34 where the State, historically, has implicitly guaranteed banks’ sol-
vency to avoid massive systemic externalities stemming from banks’ failure.35 In 
fact, the ability to price debt according to the risk profile of the borrowing bank is 
impaired by the fact that investors do not expect to suffer losses in the case of bank 
distress, so that their sensitivity to the risk profile of the borrowing bank decreases.36 
Crucially, the new resolution framework is supposed to iron out market discipline by 
eliminating, or at least minimizing, any bailout expectation.37
Finally, the ability of the borrowing bank to promptly adjust the risk profile 
in response to market signals is limited for banks mainly because of the inherent 
maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities. Arguably, this can be a merely 
29 Llewellyn (2005).
30 Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009).
31 An instance in which market foreclosure can impair market discipline is the geographical segregation 
of banking activities that were common before the liberalization wave of the 90s both in Europe and in 
the US. After the crisis, some new foreclosures have been proposed and debated, as, for instance, a ban 
on retail sale of subordinated debt (Götz and Tröger 2016). Nevertheless, this kind of foreclosure seems 
to be socially desirable and, at the same time, preserve market discipline from more severe impairments.
32 Armour et al. (2016a), p 278.
33 Diamond (1984).
34 Between 2008 and 2017, the European Commission approved over 5 trillion euro of State Aid toward 
the banking sector to cope with the latest financial crisis. Data is retrievable at http://ec.europ a.eu/compe 
titio n/state _aid/score board /index _en.html (accessed on 27 March 2019).
35 See Bodellini (2018). On top of those arguments, Avgouleas and Cullen (2014) introduced into the 
analysis also behavioral features, arguing that—in line with the behavioral economics stream of litera-
ture—shareholder and stakeholders are not able to exactly convey and process the complex amount of 
information they are provided with.
36 Santos (2014).
37 Zhou et al. (2012). More details, especially for the European resolution framework, are provided in 
Sect. 3.
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theoretical problem in times of economic expansion, when the markets are liquid38 
and the bank can adjust the composition of its assets and liabilities at low cost. On 
the other hand, in times of economic and financial turmoil, when liquidity dries up, 
adjusting the balance sheet to react to market signals might be disruptive as fire sales 
would be needed and funding opportunity might not be available for a reasonable 
price. This proved to be a decisive element in spreading and worsening the latest 
financial crisis.39
The academic and regulatory debate on whether and to what extent the assump-
tions stated earlier hold true and whether the above-mentioned conditions are ful-
filled has been lively and is still far from being settled. Three main approaches to the 
debt-discipline narrative are worth mentioning.
The first can be labelled as the ‘substitutability approach’, according to which 
the market is in a better position than the supervisor to discipline managers’ behav-
iour because of the higher quantity and quality of the available information,40 so 
that the direct disciplining channel is by far the most relevant one. The normative 
consequence of such an approach is financial deregulation and less stringent capital 
requirements41 complemented by pervasive regulation on disclosure and transpar-
ency to overcome the inherent information asymmetry problem.42
A different, moderate, approach looks at market discipline mostly as a comple-
ment to supervisory activities. In such a complementary approach, the literature 
commonly differentiates two channels through which market discipline operates. 
Thus market discipline can be defined as the combination of ‘mere’ market monitor-
ing and market influence,43 the first being the ability of investors to screen and detect 
changes in firms’ conditions and to incorporate them into the price of the security. 
On the other hand, ‘market influence’ defines the investors’ impact on banks’ behav-
iour,44 pushing them toward ‘sustainable policies’.45 Following this approach, direct 
and indirect disciplining channels are equally relevant.
A third, more radical, approach denies the suitability of financial markets to 
discipline banks’ managers. Particularly Admati and Hellwig argue that the disci-
pline of short-term debt in banking is ‘little more than a myth’.46 These authors, in 
accordance with their claim of high-equity capital requirements as the only credible 
method to enhance systemic resilience,47 contrast the narrative according to which 
debt holders can discipline the behaviour of bank management. Consequently, these 
44 Flannery (2001).
45 Lane (1993), p 56.
46 Admati and Hellwig (2013).
47 See, Admati and Hellwig (2014).
38 In fact, Pistor (2013) defines liquidity as ‘the ability to sell any asset for the other assets or cash at 
will’.
39 Brunnermeier (2009).
40 See, theoretically, Calomiris and Kahn (1991).
41 Calomiris (1998).
42 Nier and Baumann (2006).
43 Bliss (2001).
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authors explain the reliance on short-term debt as an equity-avoidance strategy, 
thereby seeking a government subsidy on debt.
The prevalence of any of these approaches in the policy discourse has shaped 
the regulatory approach in the role of market discipline. Since the effectiveness of 
market discipline, as well as its efficiency, strongly depends on the incumbent regu-
latory framework, it is useful to briefly examine the regulatory context where mar-
ket discipline operated in the last few decades. The deregulatory wave of the 1980s 
and 1990s and the increasing academic attention to market discipline in the bank-
ing sector marked its first cornerstone in the regulatory landscape with the Basel 
II Accords. Following Calomiris48 and Meyer,49 the Basel Committee for Bank-
ing Supervision (BCBS) issued a consultative paper on capital adequacy50 stating 
that ‘supervisors have a strong interest in facilitating effective market discipline as 
a lever to strengthen the safety and soundness of the banking system’. Thereafter, 
market discipline became a pillar, together with minimum capital requirements and 
a supervisory review of capital adequacy, of prudential regulation in the final ver-
sion of the Basel II Accords.51 In the end, despite different policy proposals, the 
channel through which the Pillar III rules aimed at strengthening market discipline 
was through regulation on the transparency and disclosure of information. This testi-
fies to the fact that, especially in the early 2000s, the substitutability approach won 
over the others. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, with the new Basel Accords, 
the overall regulatory framework has been maintained, even though the role of the 
supervisor has increased and the regulation has been tightened, thereby leaning 
towards the complementary approach.
In fact, despite the academic and regulatory desiderata, the market discipline 
mechanisms massively failed both in the period leading up to and during the finan-
cial crisis. They failed to detect and prevent the build-up of systemic risk during 
good times, relying too much on the information provided by Credit Rating Agen-
cies (CRAs) and Credit Default Swaps (CDSs) for monitoring purposes.52 More-
over, during the crisis, disciplining mechanisms functioned even too much, tighten-
ing the credit sources for risky institutions, with adverse repercussions for overall 
market confidence.53 In other words, the markets played an ex post role which was 
neither informative nor disciplining. The effects were not in line with the ultimate 
goal of preserving banks’ solvency ex ante and the market did not act as the gate-
keeper of financial stability.
48 Calomiris (1998).
49 Meyer (1999).
50 Basel Committee (1999).
51 Lopez et al. (2003).
52 Stephanou (2010), p 11.
53 Stephanou (2010), p 9. This is clearly shown by the required haircut for short-term secured funding, 
such as repos, that remained negligible until the beginning of financial crisis and skyrocketed as it began, 
failing to constrain the excessive risk-taking in good times and impeding market participants to access 
funding at reasonable conditions once liquidity dried up (Gorton and Metrick 2012). For a more sophis-
ticated setting where the perverse incentives provided by bankruptcy remoteness to short term secured 
creditors is taken into account, see Matta and Perotti (2017).
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In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the framework in which market discipline 
operates has changed. In fact, the Green Paper on Corporate Governance in financial 
institutions and remuneration policies, issued by the EU Commission,54 focuses on a 
market-based approach to corporate governance, highlighting the role of monitoring 
both for shareholders and debt holders. Moreover, the reforms focused not only on 
providing the (allegedly) efficient quantity and quality of information, as laid down 
in the Pillar III rules, but also on incentivizing creditors to exert market influence.
In this same vein, the Financial Stability Board (FSB), in its Key Attributes for 
Effective Resolution,55 states that an effective resolution regime should ‘be cred-
ible, and thereby enhance Market Discipline and provide incentives for market-
based solutions’. The EU’s legal implementation of the Key Attributes and the legal 
rules affecting market discipline therefore represent the next building block in the 
analysis.
3  Market Discipline and the Banking Union: The Economic Rationale 
and Legal Framework
Since the first draft of the BRRD was published, back in 2012, many authors have 
criticized it because of its excessive complexity and lack of clarity.56 Nevertheless, 
the European legislator, even without directly addressing the issue, made one point 
crystal clear: in the new regulatory environment the channel for creditors to disci-
pline banks’ behaviour has to be through bail-inable securities57 as opposed to the 
narrative on short-term debt discipline that was the mainstream in the early 2000s.58
Thus, before analyzing the role of bail-inable creditors in disciplining their bor-
rowers, it is worth describing the rationale and the main rules on resolution proce-
dures in the BRRD (Sect. 3.1) and the specific rules governing the position of credi-
tors (Sect. 3.2).
3.1  A Glance at Resolution and Bail‑in
The Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive entered into force in its entirety on the 
1st January 2016. Its main goals are, generally speaking, twofold: protecting taxpay-
ers’ money by limiting the ‘too big to fail’ problem and harmonizing bankruptcy 
procedures for financial institutions throughout the European Union. The first goal 
is not a European peculiarity59: back in January 2010, when presenting the Dodd-
Frank Act, President Obama affirmed: ‘Never again will the America taxpayer be 
54 EU Commission (2010).
55 FSB (2011).
56 Avgouleas and Goodhart (2015). For an analysis of the implementation of the first resolution cases in 
Italy and the relevant decision-making mechanisms, see Stanghellini (2016).
57 Flannery and Bliss (2018).
58 Eisenbach (2017).
59 Sester (2010).
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held hostage by a bank that is too big to fail’.60 One year later, the Financial Stability 
Board issued the Key Attributes for Effective Resolution,61 stating in its preamble 
that: ‘An effective Resolution regime should […] not rely on public solvency sup-
port and not create an expectation that such support will be available’. The BRRD 
represents, to a certain extent, the European implementation of the Key Attributes.62
On the other hand, the goal of harmonizing the resolution procedure is European-
specific and is aimed at answering the severe problem faced in resolving the issue of 
failing cross-border banks during the financial crisis.63 In fact, the lack of a common 
toolkit caused delay and inefficiencies in dealing with failing cross-border banks, 
such as the cases of Fortis and Dexia.64
The pivotal insight provided by the BRRD is that losses arising from bank dis-
tress has to be borne, at least at first, by bank insiders, shifting the paradigm from 
the bailout to the bail-in policy.65
The BRRD provides the resolution authority with four main tools to implement 
resolution: the sale of business tool,66 the bridge bank tool,67 the asset separation 
tool68 and the bail-in tool.69 Crucially, the bail-in tool can be considered the arche-
type of the new resolution framework70 as it provides the resolution authority with 
the possibility to write down and convert into equity some part of the bank’s liabili-
ties to set off the losses and restore regulatory capital.71 In order to ensure that reso-
lution is possible at any time, the resolution authority has the power to determine a 
60 On the too-big-to-fail problem and its legal implication in the European context see de Weijs (2013).
61 FSB (2011).
62 Brierley (2017). Indeed, consistently with the Financial Stability Board viewpoint, it immediately 
states that: ‘The objective of a credible recovery and resolution framework is to obviate the need for such 
action [bailouts] to the greatest extent possible’. See, recital 1 BRRD.
63 Binder (2016b).
64 Cihak and Nier (2012). The necessity to avoid fragmentation and establish a common framework for 
bank insolvency was highlighted, unsuccessfully, also before the financial crisis. See, in particular, Hüp-
kes (2002).
65 Calello and Ervin (2010); Gordon and Ringe (2015). This way, substantive regulation on bank distress 
complements the burden sharing rule imposed by the European Commission in the Banking Communi-
cation in 2013, according to which State Aid to failing banks can be considered complainant with the EU 
State Aid framework only if the losses are shared with investors in bank capital. Communication from 
the Commission on the application, from 1 August 2013, of State Aid rules to support measures in favor 
of banks in the context of the financial crisis, available at http://eur-lex.europ a.eu/legal -conte nt/EN/TXT/
PDF/?uri=OJ:C:2013:216:FULLa ndand from=IT.
66 Art. 38 BRRD.
67 Art. 40 BRRD.
68 Art. 42 BRRD.
69 Art. 43 BRRD.
70 Avgouleas and Goodhart (2015); Ringe (2018).
71 Wojcik (2016), p 107. For deeper details on eligible liabilities and the application of the bail-in see 
Sect.  4. The power to write down and convert capital instrument can be used also outside resolution 
pursuant to Art. 63 BRRD, yet liabilities that are not part of regulatory capital can suffer losses through 
write down of principal amount and/or conversion only in resolution.
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tailor-made Minimum Requirement for Eligible Liabilities and Own Funds (MREL) 
to be held by any individual bank at any time.72
A resolution procedure is triggered when a bank is considered to be failing or is 
likely to fail by the competent authority.73 Moreover, there should be no reasonable 
prospect of alternative private solutions and, crucially, the resolution shall be in the 
public interest.74
The resolution authority has no absolute power to implement the resolution pro-
cedure. Indeed, it has to pursue the specific resolution objectives set out in Article 
31(2). Namely, the resolution authority will have to ensure the continuity of critical 
functions; to avoid adverse effects on the financial system; to preserve market disci-
pline; to protect public funds; and to protect insured depositors. The Directive states 
that the resolution objectives are of equal significance and should be balanced as 
appropriate.75
For the sake of simplicity, assume that the resolution authority decides to apply 
the bail-in tool76: the amount of the liabilities that need to bear losses has to be cal-
culated.77 Such an assessment needs to be conducted in accordance with the prelimi-
nary valuation of assets and liability carried out pursuant to Article 36. The amount 
of bailed-in liabilities has to be determined so that all the losses are covered and the 
level of required capital is restored.78
Once the total amount has been determined, Articles 47 and 48 determine the 
sequence according to which the bail-in has to be applied: first, the holders of shares 
bear the losses; subsequently, other creditors can suffer losses if capital instruments 
have a lower value than the one calculated pursuant to Article 46. The creditors suf-
fer losses in accordance with the seniority of their claim as provided by national 
insolvency laws.
The expected outcome of the procedure is to make the institution that was ‘fail-
ing or likely to fail’ once again viable.79 Furthermore, ex post safeguards for the 
claim holders involved in the resolution process can be triggered pursuant to Arti-
cles 73–75 BRRD.80
72 Wojcik (2016), p 113. On the problems specific to MREL design and calibration see Tröger (2017), 
on the differences between MREL and the Total Loss Absorbency Capacity (TLAC) mandated by the 
FSB to the Globally Systemic Institutions see Lee (2015) and Young (2015).
73 Art. 32(1)(a) BRRD. For more details, see the guidelines of European Banking Authority (EBA 
2015).
74 Art. 32(5) BRRD. See, Binder (2019). The public interest test proved to be crucial in the recent cases 
involving Banca Popolare di Vicenza, Veneto Banca and ABLV. The non-confidential material on these 
cases is available at https ://srb.europ a.eu/en/conte nt/resol ution -cases .
75 Art. 31(3) BRRD. This provision will prove to be crucial in the proceeding of the analysis.
76 The proceeding of the argument would be functionally identical for other resolution tools.
77 Art. 31(2) BRRD.
78 Art. 46 BRRD. See, Wojcik (2016), p 110.
79 It is possible, and likely, that the bail-in tool is used together with other resolution tools (Arts. 38–42) 
so that the resulting bank is not the same legal entity that entered in resolution. Nonetheless, the out-
comes are functionally identical.
80 Wojcik (2016), p 122.
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3.2  A New Channel for Market Discipline (?)
Over time, the increasing awareness of the peculiar nature of banking institutions 
made it clear that depositors were unable to monitor and discipline their banks and 
had to be fully insured. In the same way, trying to impose market discipline through 
other types of creditors turned out to be unsatisfactory and, sometimes, disruptive.
What is conceptually closer to bail-inable securities, in terms of loss-absorbency 
capacity, are Subordinated Notes and Debentures (i.e.: subordinated debt) and, 
indeed, these kinds of securities were widely employed in studying market disci-
pline in the banking sector after 2000.81
Yet, different from the market for subordinated debt, the market for bail-inable 
securities has a legal origin and is tailored to regulatory goals (i.e.: making dis-
tressed banks resolvable).82 The primary channel, at least chronologically, through 
which banking crises aim to be addressed is private sector involvement, meaning 
that when resolution is triggered (some of) the private creditors of the distressed 
bank bear the losses.83 This, in the desiderata of the EU legislator, shall allow for the 
sufficient recapitalization of the bank, thereby avoiding public intervention.
Therefore, the pay-off of the regulator/supervisor should be—theoretically—
aligned with the pay-off of the bail-inable debt holders, so that the theoretical 
assumption discussed in Sect.  2 should hold true.84 This, in turn, would facilitate 
the alignment of bank insiders with the public interest through the market discipline 
channel. Article 32(1)(a) in fact states that a necessary condition to trigger resolu-
tion is that the institution is ‘failing or likely to fail’. This means that the holders 
of bail-inable securities will suffer losses once the institution is ‘failing or likely to 
fail’; therefore this latter instance is what both supervisors/regulators and debt hold-
ers will strive, ex ante, to avoid.
Given these regulatory expectations, one would expect the related rules to be 
consistently in line with providing bail-inable creditors with suitable incentives to 
engage in monitoring and allowing long-term investors to appreciate the risk profile 
of the instruments and behave accordingly. Nonetheless, the interplay between the 
multiple policy goals pursued by the Directive, as will be argued later on in this arti-
cle, hamper the possibility to provide bail-inable creditors with optimal incentives. 
In particular, the protection of the property rights of creditors and the preservation 
of financial stability require norms that deviate from the market discipline objective.
81 See, for instance, Sironi (2003).
82 Bail-inable debt can be seen as a class of securities, which is in turn made up of sub-classes according 
to the seniority of individual securities. Nonetheless, it is highly doubtful that bail-inable creditors can be 
treated as a class, i.e.: interests are not homogeneous and therefore behaviors can be highly divergent. For 
the purpose of this study, as it aims to assess the reliability of regulator’s desiderata, the homogeneity of 
creditors is assumed as the regulator does.
83 Hadjiemmanuil (2015).
84 Bliss (2001).
The Bail‑in Beyond Unpredictability: Creditors’ Incentives…
123
4  Market for Bail‑Inable Securities: The Rules of the Game
The BRRD shapes the market for bail-inable securities so that the analysis of the 
relevant norms can provide a good perspective of its functioning mechanisms and 
the resulting incentives for bail-inable creditors. Throughout the analysis, two main 
aspects have to be pointed out. On the one hand, BRRD rules can allocate a high 
degree of discretion to public authorities, generating ex ante uncertainty for the 
investor. On the other hand, legal provisions may hinge on investors’ incentives, 
even concerning any discretionary considerations. The two instances are often con-
current; still, for the purpose of this article, disentangling them is crucial.
The relevant norms can be categorized into three broad groups. The first group of 
norms defines the borders of the market for bail-inable securities (Sect. 4.1); the sec-
ond states the principles on bail-inable creditors’ treatment (Sect. 4.2). These groups 
set the baseline of the analysis. The third group of norms, instead, squeezes overlap-
ping policy goals into the statute on the market for bail-inable securities, thereby 
modifying creditors’ incentives toward monitoring by shielding their claims from 
losses (Sect. 4.3).
4.1  Defining the Borders
Article 44(1) of the BRRD states that, in principle, all of the liabilities of the institu-
tion are bail-inable, allowing resolution authorities to re-engineer the whole liability 
side of the bank’s balance sheet.85 Nevertheless, the remainder of the same Arti-
cle and other norms disseminated in the BRRD reduce the bail-in tool’s scope of 
application.
Article 44(2) and (3) define the claims that are not to be written down or con-
verted into equity if the resolution is triggered.86 Specifically, Article 44(2) lists the 
classes of liabilities which are legally exempt from a bail-in. Differently, Article 
44(3) lists the ‘exceptional’ factual instances in which, once the resolution is trig-
gered, the resolution authority has the discretion not to apply the bail-in of other-
wise bail-inable liabilities. The main rationale behind the exclusion of certain lia-
bilities is, unsurprisingly, to safeguard financial stability.87 Hence, deposits covered 
by Deposit Guarantee Schemes (DGSs), short-term claims by other banks or back-
stop mechanisms and secured claims are legally exempt. Additionally, the resolution 
authorities retain the power not to bail-in, totally or partially, those liabilities that 
are necessary to ensure the continuity of crucial functions (e.g.: payment systems, 
IT infrastructure). The same holds true for liabilities whose bail-in might provoke 
the risk of contagion or a run (e.g.: SME deposits larger than the covered amount, as 
expressly stated in the Directive).
The other cases involving legal exemptions follow two additional rationales. First, 
the Directive aims to avoid de facto bailouts, meaning that public money is used to 
85 Tröger (2017), p 16.
86 Gardella (2015), para. 11.39; Wojcik (2016), p 109.
87 Zhou et al. (2012), p 13.
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recapitalize the distressed banks even through the bail-in mechanism. Therefore, lia-
bilities arising from mandatory contributions to DGSs88 and to Tax and Social Secu-
rity Authorities have been exempted. Second, the Directive exempts those liabilities 
whose very nature falls outside the purposes of the resolution procedure, such as 
retail and employment-related liabilities.
The BRRD allocates further discretion to the resolution authority which is enti-
tled to exempt some classes of liabilities from a bail-in on a case-by-case basis. 
Among them, it is worth mentioning those liabilities that are impossible to be 
promptly bailed-in or whose bail-in would provoke a value destruction that is greater 
than in the scenario where they are not bailed-in.89
Concerning deposits, in Articles 108 and 109 the Directive further specifies 
their special status. Indeed, Article 108 lays down that non-covered deposits, hence 
eligible for a bail-in,90 shall be senior in comparison to unsecured, non-preferred 
claims.91 Moreover, Article 109 states that Deposit Guarantee Schemes are liable for 
the amount of covered deposits that would have been written down,92 making them 
an additional player that should, theoretically, exert market discipline.93
Finally, it is important to address one last question: which purposes do Article 44 
serve? Are those directly linked to the resolution objectives?
Figure  1 summarizes the interplay between the resolution objectives, as stated 
in Article 31, and the rationales underlying the provision of Article 44. The figure 
makes clear that, in general, the exemptions and exceptions in Article 44 directly 
serve the resolution objectives, as the match between the two is striking, sometimes 
even at the level of the individual wording.
88 The public nature of the DGSs contributions have been recently questioned by the General Court of 
the European Union in the so-called ‘Tercas case’. In that case, the Commission prevented the Italian 
DGS, ‘Fondo Interbancario di Tutela dei Depositi (“the FITD”)’ from covering Tercas negative equity, 
claiming that it would result in a State Aid. The General Count annulled that decision, stating that the 
intervention of the FITD would have not resulted in State Aid; see Judgment of the General Court of 19 
March 2019, Italy and Others v. Commission, Joined Cases T-98/16, T-196/16 and T-198/16. Such case 
does not hamper, per se, the argument proposed above, since the contribution due to the DGSs are still 
exempted for the same ratio. Moreover, the outcome of the case is still uncertain, as the appeal is now 
pending in front of the ECJ. Finally, it is worth noticing that the Italian case might not be prone to gen-
eral application throughout all Member States. In fact, the FITD is de jure a private consortium, whereas 
the vast majority of other DSGs are public entities.
89 Ringe and Patel (2019); Stiglitz et al. (2017).
90 Those are deposits from natural persons and SMEs greater than 100,000 €, pursuing Art. 6 of the 
Directive 2014/49/EU.
91 Excluding eligible deposits, those are to be considered the most senior bail-in eligible liabilities.
92 Art. 108(b)(ii) rank this liability as senior compared to any other eligible liability, including eligible 
deposits.
93 The role of Deposit Guarantee Schemes in Resolution might sharply changed after the General Court 
of the European Union recently annulled a decision of the European Commission that forbid the Ital-
ian Deposit Guarantee to provide aid to Banca Tercas, forcing it into liquidation. The decision, in the 
moment I am writing, has still to be published in the official journal, an unofficial version has been pub-
lished in the form of a press release on 19 March 2019 and can be retrieved at: https ://curia .europ a.eu/
jcms/uploa d/docs/appli catio n/pdf/2019-03/cp190 034en .pdf.
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Only the exemptions concerning the liabilities towards employees and retail cred-
itors94 can be considered exogenous. On the other hand, all other cases are to be 
considered a direct application of the provision of Article 31 on the resolution in 
general to the specific case of the bail-in tool.95
Fig. 1  Article 44 and resolution objectives
94 Art. 44(2)(g)(i) and (ii). See Nieto (2016), p 138.
95 For the purpose of the present article, i.e.: assessing the impact of the BRRD on the functioning of 
External Governance mechanisms through market discipline, voting shares fall outside the scope of the 
analysis as well. Note that there is no parallel between voting rights and capital class, as even CET1 
instruments can be issues without voting rights attached to the capital ones, as expressly stated by Art. 
32(4) Regulation (EU) 575/2013— Capital Requirement Regulation (CRR) [2013] OJ L 176/1.
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4.2  Principles Concerning the Creditor’s Treatment: Hierarchy of the Equitable 
Treatment Principles
Article 34 BRRD lists the general principles that shall govern the resolution pro-
cedure. Unsurprisingly, shareholders bear the first losses. Thereafter, the Directive 
regulates the treatment of bail-inable creditors in three different directions: the order 
in which creditors have to bear further losses; the link between creditors belonging 
to the same class; the relationship between the losses borne during resolution and 
under normal insolvency proceedings.96
In resolution, any class of creditors shall suffer losses in accordance with the 
order of priority of their claim under normal insolvency procedures (the hierarchy 
principle).97 At the same time, within each class, creditors are treated in an equitable 
manner (the equitable treatment principle).98 Even though the idea behind those two 
principles appears to be straightforward, their actual functioning is likely to generate 
more friction than expected because of the complexity of the legal issues tackled by 
the Directive.
In fact, in the bail-in context, the Directive sets out further rules to specify those 
principles. After the resolution authority has defined the amount by which a bank’s 
liabilities have to be written down or converted (Article 46),99 Articles 47 and 48 
regulate the sequence of write down and conversions, according to the hierarchy 
principle. Such a sequence is the mirror image of the loss absorbency capacity, that 
is: the higher the loss-absorbency capacity of an instrument, the sooner it comes 
into the sequence of write down or conversion. Article 48 also regulates the condi-
tions for moving from one class of holders to the following one100: the latter can be 
bailed-in if and only if the bail-in of the previous class was insufficient to iron out 
the losses and restore a sufficient level of equity.101
Nonetheless, the bail-in tool cannot be plainly applied only according to the level 
of loss absorbency capacity. Indeed, for any of the rationales listed in Fig. 1, it can 
Fig. 2  Article 48 BRRD: sequence of write down and conversion
96 No creditors worse off, see Sect. 4.3.
97 Art. 34(1)(b) BRRD.
98 Art. 34(1)(f) BRRD.
99 Such an assessment has to be carried out in accordance with the valuation of Art. 36.
100 See Art. 47(3)(b) and (c).
101 Pursuant to the provisions on capital requirements embedded in the CRR-CRDIV package.
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happen in quite the opposite direction, as the dashed line in Fig. 2 aim to symbolize. 
For instance, imagine two liabilities, A and B, belonging to the same class. When 
bail-in is triggered, the resolution authority appraises what is practically infeasible 
to promptly bail-in liability A,102 so the authority writes down or converts liability 
B, while liability A suffers no losses.103
As noted earlier, the exemptions and exceptions contemplated by Article 44 are 
themselves closely tied to the objectives of resolution. Therefore, it is possible to 
infer that in the implementation of a bail-in, unequal treatment should be expected 
to be the rule rather than the exception.104 This, in turn, decreases the predictability 
of the bail-in outcome, thereby impacting the incentives of the holders of bail-inable 
securities to be monitored.105
4.3  Market Discipline and Competing Policy Objective: No Creditor Worse Off 
(NCWO) Principle
Within any resolution procedure, creditors cannot incur greater losses than those 
they would have incurred if the institution had been liquidated (the NCWO princi-
ple).106 Accordingly, creditors who suffer greater losses are entitled to compensation 
equal to the shortfall they have suffered.107 Intuitively, such a rule impacts on the 
incentives of bail-inable creditors to discipline bankers, as noted by Chiu: ‘no credi-
tor worse off principle could also convince bail-inable debt holders that taking a 
back seat in monitoring would make no difference’.108 The remainder of this section 
will describe the legal concept of NCWO and its impact on the incentives toward 
monitoring, explaining why the intuitive idea of Chiu is likely to materialize.
Functionally, the NCWO principle mandates that investors in bail-inable secu-
rities have to be indifferent between bail-in and liquidation.109 Nevertheless, such 
a welfare-enhancing constraint is not through an ex ante property entitlement, but 
rather through an ex post liability rule.110 In fact, the BRRD gives the resolution 
authority the power to impact on the claim of bail-inable investors without grant-
ing them any procedural or substantive rights during resolution, as opposed to 
normal insolvency proceedings.111 Therefore, the property rights embedded in the 
bailed-in claims cannot be protected through ex ante rights preventing the resolution 
102 Art. 44(3)(a).
103 Note that the same can occur even if liability A is junior to liability B. In the first case, where A and 
B belong to the same class, Art. 44 relaxes the equitable treatment principle; in the second case, where A 
is junior to B, Art. 44 relaxes the hierarchy principle.
104 Binder (2016a), p 45.
105 Tröger (2018), p 47.
106 Art. 34(1)(g) BRRD.
107 De Serière (2016), p 376.
108 Chiu (2014), p 627.
109 This is under the assumption of perfect compensation in the case of detrimental treatment in the 
implementation of the resolution tool and of the absence of judicial costs. See, Binder (2016a), p 44.
110 Calabresi and Melamed (1972).
111 See, for instance, Arts. 38(1), 40(1), 42(1) and 85 BRRD.
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authority from causing unjustified harm to bail-inable debtholders (the property rule 
in the Calabresi and Melamed framework). Yet, some degree of ex post protection is 
granted through compensation when the NCWO is violated (the liability rule).
The rationale for such a principle is twofold and reflects the interplay between 
competing policy objectives. On the one hand, the Directive wanted to avoid obsta-
cles to prompt resolution by waiving all the procedural rights that creditors have in 
normal bankruptcy procedures, so as to safeguard financial stability. On the other 
hand, the NCWO represents a way to protect the creditors’ property rights112 by 
means of compensation so as to respect the right to property.113
In a nutshell, the NCWO principle should theoretically guarantee the protection 
of property rights so that they are not incentivized to engage in disruptive runs in the 
proximity of resolution.114 At the same time, it provides resolution authorities with 
some degree of flexibility to promptly implement a bail-in.
Indeed, the salient aspect of the NCWO’s legal design is that the European legis-
lator, for the sake of facilitating the prompt resolvability of distressed banks, has not 
provided any procedural rights to bailed-in creditors, as opposed to normal insol-
vency procedures.115 This allows the resolution process to be speeded up, which rep-
resents a crucial aspect of the success of any bank resolution.116
As previously mentioned, the maximum amount of losses that investors can bear 
is equal to the amount of losses that they would have borne in the case of liquida-
tion. This was meant to be a safe harbour for the resolution authority,117 in the sense 
that any resolution action can be promptly implemented while any other order of 
consideration, such as creditors’ treatment, was left to an ex post valuation. Never-
theless, such a design poses considerable legal challenges,118 so that many commen-
tators doubt whether this tool can deliver the desired objective.119
In applying the bail-in tool, the resolution authority has to adhere to the valuation 
of assets and liabilities carried out under Article 36.120 Article 36(8) mandates the 
independent expert to include in the valuation an estimate of the treatment that each 
112 Wojcik (2016), pp 116 et seq.
113 On the compatibility of the burden-sharing exercise in bank distress with the right to property the 
ECJ delivered a preliminary ruling in a Slovenian case, in which European Judges deemed that the right 
to property can be interpreted as not precluding the burden sharing of losses (Kotnik and others, Case 
C-526/14, ECLI:EU:C:2016:570). For a more extensive legal reasoning on this point, see the opinion of 
Advocate General Wahl, delivered on 18 February 2016 in the same case.
114 Wojcik (2016), p 120.
115 On the ontological difference between bank resolution and insolvency law see Hadjiemmanuil 
(2015), p 232.
116 Huertas (2016).
117 Zhou et al. (2012).
118 Gardella (2015); Jacobs and Mitchell (2014).
119 This is the reason why Wojcik (2015) has stated that the NCWO principle will be a crucial element 
for determining bail-in effectiveness.
120 Such a procedure consists of a fair, prudent and realistic valuation carried out by a person independ-
ent from any public authority before the resolution authority takes any resolution action. If, as is likely, 
the urgency of the situation makes it impossible to perform the independent valuation, the resolution 
authority is entitled to carry out a provisional evaluation following a simplified procedure. See, Art. 
36(2) and (9).
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class of creditors would have been expected to receive under normal insolvency pro-
cedures.121 Therefore, in applying the bail-in tool, the resolution authority ex ante 
complies with the general principle of the NCWO by adhering to the preliminary 
valuation of the counter-factual insolvency scenario.
Nevertheless, given the opaqueness and complexity of banks’ assets and liabili-
ties and considering the large array of material impediments that the resolution pro-
cess can face, it is possible and likely that the ex ante valuation differs from the real 
value of a bank’s assets and liabilities.122 Therefore, after the resolution action has 
been taken and implemented, an independent expert shall carry out an ex post valu-
ation (Article 74). This represents the moment when the lack of ex ante procedural 
rights is counterbalanced by ex post safeguards. Article 75 states that if creditors are 
worse off under the resolution process, they are entitled to be compensated.123 The 
resolution financing arrangements shall pay out such compensation.
Therefore, from a functional perspective, the NCWO represents an (uncertain)124 
ceiling to expected losses that creditors might have suffered in a hypothetical world 
where a bail-in does not exist. This means that the NCWO also impacts on ex ante 
incentives toward monitoring: it ex ante caps the level of expected losses, so that 
even incentives to monitor are modified.
The NCWO can become a concrete impediment to the resolvability of distressed 
banks through some specific legal channels. Those can be described as belonging 
to three different categories: inherent in resolution; inherent in bankruptcy law; and 
deriving from specific obstacles to resolvability.125
Among the channels inherent in the design of the BRRD, the application of exclu-
sions and exemptions provided by Article 44(2) and (3) of the Directive are worth 
mentioning. In fact, by definition, that generates a mismatch between the treatment 
of the other creditors under resolution and under insolvency.126
121 The same paragraph clarifies that such an estimate ‘shall not affect the application of the “no creditor 
worse off” principle to be carried out under Article 74’.
122 Hellwig (2018).
123 The same applies to DGSs in the case of Art. 109(2).
124 To make this certain, one should assume that the preliminary valuation exactly matches the final val-
uation under Art. 74 BRRD and that investors have ex ante information about the preliminary valuation. 
On the assumptions necessary for a smooth functioning of the bail-in mechanisms see Sect. 5.
125 For detailed examples of how each of these channels can result in impediments to resolvability 
because of the NCWO principle see the Appendix.
126 For the interaction between Art. 44 and the NCWO principle see Hadjiemmanuil (2015), pp 236 et 
seq. For a concrete application of the NCWO principle to the exclusion of liabilities covered by netting 
arrangements from a bail-in, see Davies and Dobler (2011).
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Speaking of the channels inherent in bankruptcy law, clawbacks127 represent the 
main and most intuitive feature to be discussed.128 In this case, the (potentially non-
trivial) amount of money that is recovered from the clawback litigation procedure 
would enrich the amount of assets which should be devoted to creditors under nor-
mal insolvency procedures.
Regarding the third category, it is worth mentioning the case where theoretically 
eligible liabilities cannot be bailed-in due to cross-jurisdictional issues.129 In fact, 
despite Article 55 mandating the issuers of bail-inable liabilities to include a con-
tractual clause for the third-country recognition of the power of resolution authori-
ties to bail them in, third-country investors, as well as third-country authorities, are 
not prone to accept such clauses.130
All these cases show, along with many studies,131 that determining the counter-
factual scenario under liquidation is, to say the very least, doubtful and will result 
in long-lasting and costly litigation.132 Nonetheless, the way in which the courts 
are going to decide these cases is unclear; namely, the extent to which courts will, 
implicitly or explicitly, take into account the recovery rates in similar cases as a 
guideline for their task.133
So far, the only application of a resolution procedure at the European level, the 
Banco Popular case,134 has somehow confirmed the fear that the NCWO principle 
will act as a disincentive toward monitoring ex ante given the expectation of the 
ex post safeguard. Indeed, several cases are currently pending before the European 
129 Lehmann (2017).
130 This obstacle to resolvability has been directly acknowledged by the European Commission Explana-
tory Memorandum to the proposal for amending Article 55, Proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2014/59/EU on loss-absorbing and recapitalization 
capacity of credit institutions and investment firms, 23 November 2016, COM (2016) 852 final.
131 See, for instance, Gleeson (2012); Hadjiemmanuil (2015).
132 De Serière (2016).
133 For example, the anecdotal evidence of Lehman Brothers (Fleming and Sarkar 2013) shows that the 
NCWO could become extremely burdensome as far as the resolution is concerned—financing arrange-
ments. In fact, the senior creditors’ recovery rate in Lehman Brothers’ German and UK subsidiaries have 
been reached 100% (Binder 2015, fn. 31). See, also, a further online article on the same topic, from 
which the figures reported here have been extracted. The article can be retrieved at http://liber tystr eetec 
onomi cs.newyo rkfed .org/2014/04/the-failu re-resol ution -of-lehma n-broth ers-.html, accessed on 8 Oct. 
2018.
134 Fernández Acín (2018).
128 Consider the case, extensively discussed in the literature in recent years, of contractual or statu-
tory clawback provisions pertaining to executives’ remuneration (Murphy 2013; Sharfman et al. 2009). 
An example is the one introduced in Section 304 of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act in the US, on which see 
Schwartz (2008). That kind of provision states that, in case of managerial misconduct, bonuses and per-
formance-related components of the remuneration packages can be clawed back.
127 Clawback is a term used in bankruptcy law to indicate any repayment to receivers of a company in 
bankruptcy, any preference payments, or monies deemed to have benefited one party at the expense of 
others during the period of financial distress. Functionally this is a way to attract further assets for distri-
bution to the mass of creditors subject to the condition that those assets were not meant to be allocated 
elsewhere in the first place because of bankruptcy norms. In this situation, the party whose assets are 
clawed back becomes a creditor that is ranked as it would have been if the unlawful repayment would 
never have taken place. It is worth noting that clawbacks can be bank-specific (Hill 2012).
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Court of Justice challenging the decision of the Single Resolution Board,135 many of 
which are seeking compensation for a breach of the NCWO safeguard.136
4.4  Market Discipline and Competing Policy Objective: The ‘8% Contribution’ 
Threshold Rule for Granting Public Funds
In complying with the burden-sharing policy imposed by the Banking Communi-
cation in 2013,137 the Directive mandates that any public support138 to distressed 
institutions is conditional upon a minimum amount of private sector involvement.139 
Accordingly, Article 37(10)(a), in laying down the general principles regarding res-
olution tools, set the amount of burden sharing at 8% of the total liabilities (includ-
ing own funds), measured in accordance with the valuation under Article 36.
The rationale for Article 37(10)(a) is to give the necessary flexibility to the new 
resolution framework and, at the same time, to mitigate the moral hazard problems 
arising from the implicit government subsidy for banks. Indeed, there is wide con-
sensus, even among scholars and practitioners who strongly support the new legal 
framework, concerning the fact that in the case of a systemic crisis the bail-in tool 
will not be able to do all of the necessary work by itself. Therefore, the Banking 
Communication in 2013 and, eventually, the BRRD tried to strike a balance between 
the instances of financial stability, competition in the banking sector and safeguard-
ing public finances.
Furthermore, Article 44(4) and (5) refer to the possibility of granting public funds 
when the losses that should have been borne by liabilities which have been excluded 
from a bail-in cannot be completely passed on to other creditors. Again, such a pos-
sibility is conditional on the fact that the at least 8% contribution to loss absorption 
has been complied with.140 This represents a way to deal with insufficient eligible 
funds. It is worth noting that under Article 44 the presence of a ‘very extraordinary 
situation of a systemic crisis’ is not required for granting public aid.
135 The decision and other relevant disclosed material can be retrieved at https ://srb.europ a.eu/en/
node/315.
136 See, for instance, Case T-570/17, Algebris (UK) and Others v. Commission, still pending before the 
ECJ where the plaintiff claims: ‘the valuation of Banco Popular, which formed the basis for the reso-
lution action taken under the Resolution Scheme, was not fair, prudent or reliable, and was inconsist-
ent with the ‘“no creditor worse off principle”; it did not therefore constitute accurate and reliable and 
consistent evidence on which to base the Resolution Scheme; and it was not capable of supporting the 
contested decision. Further and for the same reasons, the Resolution Scheme (and so the Decision) was 
manifestly disproportionate by going beyond the measures necessary to secure the resolution objectives’.
137 Communication from the Commission on the application, from 1 August 2013, of State Aid rules 
to support measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis (‘Banking Communication’) 
(2013/C 216/01).
138 In the form provided by Arts. 56–58 BRRD.
139 Hadjiemmanuil (2016).
140 Art. 44(8) contemplates a situation in which even the 8% contribution is waived, subject to a series 
of conditions among which is the contribution of at least 20% of Risk Weighted assets (RWA) and assets 
below 900 billion EUR on a consolidated basis. Those requirements mean that this further flexibility in 
granting public funds is reserved for non-systemically relevant institutions with high quality assets.
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From the perspective of bail-inable creditors, assuming that the Directive will 
be consistently implemented, those norms tell us that they can expect some public 
relief if and only if their claim is senior to at least 8% of the bail-inable eligible lia-
bilities.141 The way in which this impacts on the investor’s incentives is clear: junior 
claimers have, on paper, ‘full skin in the game’ so that they should be fully incentiv-
ized to monitor banks’ behaviour.
Nonetheless, the 8% threshold is not necessarily and consistently applied in all 
cases of public intervention. Indeed, there might be cases, such as precautionary 
recapitalization and liquidation aid,142 where public funds can directly or indirectly 
cover the losses that should have been allocated to the private sector according to 
the bail-in rule. In particular, precautionary recapitalization143 allows for a direct 
injection of capital that is ‘necessary to address capital shortfall established in the 
national, Union or SSM-wide stress tests’. The measure can only be applied to 
solvent institutions and is conditional on approval under the EU State Aid frame-
work.144 This requires burden sharing according to the Banking Communication 
of 2013: private sector actors need to be involved, but the amount of burden to be 
shared in order to have clearance under State Aid law is not specified and, thus, 
it can be lower than 8%.145 Therefore, also creditors below the 8% threshold can 
expect to be at least partially shielded by public intervention via a precautionary 
recapitalization of solvent but distressed banks.146
142 This is a peculiar contingency that has materialized in the case of Veneto Banks and will be dis-
cussed in Sect. 5.3.
143 Art. 32(4)(d) BRRD.
144 Bodellini (2017).
145 Precautionary recapitalization has been applied concerning the fourth largest Italian bank, Monte 
Paschi Spa, in 2017. European Commission, C (2017) 4690 final. State Aid SA.47677 (2017/N), Italy 
New aid and amended restructuring plan of Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena. Retrievable at http://
ec.europ a.eu/compe titio n/state _aid/cases /27003 7/27003 7_19514 96_149_2.pdf.
 The Italian government injected 5.4 billion euro of capital and guaranteed 15 billion of subordinated 
debt (Götz et  al. 2017). In the decision of the European Commission on State Aid the Commission 
approved the recapitalization acknowledging that the burden sharing between the State and the investor 
had occurred in the form of a swap between subordinated debt and ordinary shares. The decision stated 
that: ‘The Commission observes that there is sufficient burden-sharing by shareholders and also subordi-
nated debt holder’ (para. 103); yet, it refrained from quantifying the amount of burden sharing deemed to 
be sufficient. Note that precautionary recapitalization is one of the options currently on the table also to 
deal with the distress of Banca Carige Group. See Dias et al. (2019).
146 The application of the precautionary recapitalization tool is critically discussed in Véron (2017).
141 This outcome consists of a combination of Art. 37(10), Art. 34(1)(b) on the hierarchy principle, and 
Art. 44(2) and (3) exemptions and exceptions in applying the bail-in tool.
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5  Effort in Monitoring in an Ideal Environment
What prevents market discipline from effectively working is twofold. In the first 
place, the implicit guarantee is still in place, given the impracticability of the resolu-
tion framework.147 Moreover, even assuming that resolution will be applied and will 
deliver efficient outcomes, scholars have argued that the high level of the ex ante 
unpredictability of the bail-in process would endanger the ability of the investor to 
discipline the risk-taking behaviour of their borrowers.148
To test the hypothesis stated at the beginning of this article, i.e.: the incentives 
toward monitoring are inherently diluted by the BRRD’s legal design, this section 
conceptualises an ideal environment where the exogenous impediments to resolution 
are ruled out by assumption, so as to assess the impact of the legal design in itself. 
This allows us to introduce and explain the basic structure of incentives to monitor 
provided by the Directive’s legal design. Eventually, Sect. 5.2 introduces the NCWO 
principle and the 8% rule, discussing how they dilute the investors’ incentives to 
monitor.
5.1  Dreaming of a Smooth Resolution: Assumptions for an Ideal World
A smooth and credible resolution is what the EU financial regulator dreams of. Or, 
in more hopeful words, the medium-term objective to be pursued. In any case, for 
studying the impact of the legal design of the BRRD, it is necessary to dig into the 
dream, indeed assuming that resolution works smoothly and credibly. Specifically, it 
is necessary to adopt two broad assumptions:
(a) the smooth functioning of the bail-in mechanism; i.e.: a bail-in is always and 
consistently applied in the case of bank distress and the role of supervision is 
taken for granted149;
(b) the smooth functioning of the market for bail-inable securities; i.e.: investors are 
able to screen and monitor the risk-taking behaviour of the bank and adjust the 
price accordingly.
The latter assumption, which specifically pertains to the market for bail-inable 
securities, can be further disentangled in consequent assumptions that are necessary 
for (b) to hold true. Namely:
148 Tröger (2018).
149 This broad assumption is made up of several narrower ones discussed in the literature. See, for 
instance, Avgouleas and Goodhart (2015) and Stiglitz et al. (2017).
147 Many problematic instances have arisen from this perspective. The most discussed and serious one is 
the inability of the resolution procedure to deal with systemic crises.
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• the bail-in commitment is ex ante credible150;
• the market for bail-inable securities is liquid151 and a secondary market for them 
exists, so that the risk profile the of bank’s behaviour can be continuously moni-
tored152;
• investors have perfect information in determining the outcome of applying the 
rules disciplining the market of bail-inable securities, as discussed in Sect. 4;
• supervisory and resolution authorities exercise their discretionary powers con-
sistently, so that investors are able to fully anticipate the outcome of the resolu-
tion procedure;
• bail-inable creditors have homogeneous interests; hence, they can be treated as a 
class;
• the MREL is adequately determined by the resolution authority and is complied 
with by the borrowing banks.153
Given that these assumptions hold true, the (fully rational) investor will be faced 
with the norms discussed back in Sect. 4 and will respond accordingly. That is to 
say, as long as the return on their investment is fully subject to the viability of their 
borrower, investors will take each and every efficient action to maintain such viabil-
ity. Specifically, investors will undertake those actions as long as the marginal cost 
of exerting monitoring is lower than the marginal benefit investors’ gain, in expected 
terms. Indeed, monitoring is not a costless activity since gathering and computing 
relevant information about the risk-profile and sustainability of the borrowing bank 
involves activities that come at a cost, e.g.: a team of analysts can be employed to 
take the investment decision and to determine the investor’s willingness to pay for 
bail-inable securities. Moreover, since a secondary market for bail-inable securities 
exists by assumption, monitoring shall be carried out on a continuous basis, so as 
to decide whether to exit (or enter) the market and at what price. Therefore, at this 
point, it is crucial to introduce the cost of engaging in monitoring to understand how 
the incentives toward monitoring respond to the legal framework. In fact, if moni-
toring were costless, investors would always monitor their borrower to the greatest 
extent possible so as to correctly price their investment. Therefore, one can think of 
monitoring cost as the dimension that any investor has to consider in deciding if and 
to what extent it seeks to discipline its borrower through price adjustment.
Within the framework described so far, the bank is entering into resolution with 
an attached probability which is discerned by assumption.154 Investors decide, 
accordingly, the level of effort in monitoring that maximizes their return. Indeed, the 
153 Dewatripont (2014).
154 While in reality there is, at least to some extent, ex ante Knightian uncertainty.
151 Following Pistor (2013), p 316.
152 If such a secondary market does not exist, a further assumption has to be taken; namely, the risk pro-
file of each security is stable over time, so that once it has been priced and sold in the primary market the 
disciplining activity is concluded. On the dynamic nature of the risk-profile of bail-inable securities see 
Tröger (2018), p 37.
150 This is the direct consequence of point (a); for a setting in which bail-in commitments are credible 
see Stiglitz et al. (2017).
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assumptions ensure that investors are able to impact the probability of a bank entering 
into resolution.
The level of effort crucially depends on the costs and benefits of monitoring. The 
critical aspect is the amount of losses, in ex ante expected terms, that investors are 
going to suffer in the case of resolution (i.e.: the bank reaches the point of non-viabil-
ity). The aim of the investor is to minimize the expected losses; accordingly, investors 
are faced with the actual costs of engaging in monitoring activities (e.g.: conveying 
information). On the other hand, the benefits stemming from engaging in monitoring 
activities consist of a decrease in the probability of entering into resolution. In this 
framework, each creditor will engage in monitoring as long as the benefits (i.e.: the 
reduction of expected losses in relation to the reduction in the probability of resolu-
tion) outweigh the costs (i.e.: the costs of engaging in monitoring). Throughout the 
analysis, the costs of monitoring will be stable so that the level of discipline that is 
efficient for investors varies according to the benefits stemming from monitoring.
To substantiate this theoretical and seemingly abstract construct, think of 
Investor ‘I’, according to its seniority, facing a loss of 100 in the case of resolu-
tion; the probability of resolution, which is here known by assumption, is 10%. 
The expected losses are 10 in this scenario. The investor knows, by assumption, 
that when engaging in monitoring activities that cost 2, the probability of resolu-
tion decreases to 7.5%. The expected losses are now 7.5 so that it is efficient for 
the investor to engage in monitoring. In a similar setting, for the investor it is not 
efficient to engage in monitoring activities that cost 4 if the probability of reso-
lution decreases to 6.5% as the costs (the actual monitoring costs) outweigh the 
benefits (a decrease in the expected losses).
The underlying criterion to carry out the analysis is to understand what and 
who shields creditors from bearing losses. Indeed, according to this criterion the 
rules shaping the incentive structure of investors can be divided into two catego-
ries: the ones dealing with ‘contractual shielding’ mechanisms, i.e.: embedded in 
investors’ contractual arrangements; and the ones introducing regulatory excep-
tions to the bail-in rules, further protecting investors than the protection granted 
to them under their contractual entitlement. This second category can be labelled 
as ‘external shielding’. The first category of norms encompasses, for what is 
here of interest, the hierarchy and the equitable treatment principles, whereas the 
NCWO rule and the 8% rule belong to the second category.
Therefore, the rules on ‘contractual shielding’ represent the baseline scenario 
that each investor in bail-inable debt faces: the hierarchy and equitable treatment 
principles describe how losses are allocated, shaping the basic incentive structure 
of bail-inable creditors and pertaining to their contractual entitlement. In fact, 
for instance, an investor in a senior unsecured bond is contractually entitled to 
be shielded from losses by investors in subordinated debt. In the same vein, two 
investors in senior unsecured debt are contractually entitled to be treated in an 
equitable manner. Figure  3 depicts the baseline scenario where a bail-in works 
smoothly and the probability of resolution to be triggered depends on the level 
of monitoring. The y-axis represents the amount of the expected loss, while the 
x-axis represents the liability-side of the bank balance sheet, ordered according to 
the seniority of each class.
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The expected losses are decreasing in seniority and are stable within each class, 
thereby complying with the hierarchy and equitable treatment principles. In this sce-
nario, the expected losses are plainly allocated to bail-inable creditors according to 
their seniority (the hierarchy principle) and are constant within each class of credi-
tors (the equitable treatment principle).
Specifically, the hierarchy principle, from the investor’s perspective, means that 
the higher the seniority of a claim, the lower the expected losses. Therefore, the 
optimal level of effort in monitoring is, unsurprisingly, lower for senior unsecured 
creditors than for subordinated ones. The equitable treatment principle implies that 
expected losses are not decreasing in a linear fashion, but in a staggered way so that 
the level of expected losses is constant for the creditors with the same seniority.
At this stage of the analysis, the assumptions allow us not to consider the impact 
of the exemptions/exclusions under Article 44(2) and (3). In fact, investors who 
know in advance which liabilities fall under those provisions embed the information 
in their behaviour. The consequences of such an instance are twofold: on the one 
hand, the creditors that will be excluded or exempted will not engage in monitor-
ing.155 On the other hand, the exemptions/exclusions do not directly affect investors’ 
incentives, but only the level of expected losses.
Finally, it is worth noting that, according to the bold assumptions stated at the 
beginning of the section, the private incentives of single investors are aligned, at 
an aggregate level, with social welfare. In fact, investors will engage in monitoring 
Fig. 3  Basic incentive structure of bail-inable creditors
155 The counter-intuitive consequence of this stream of argumentation is that, in the real world scenario, 
a non-trivial level of uncertainty in this respect increases the ex ante incentives to monitor for at least 
these creditors.
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as long as the magnitude according to which the expected losses will decrease out-
weigh the costs of monitoring. At an aggregate level, this means that the probability 
of resolution will be minimized through creditors’ monitoring.
5.2  A Dream Turning into a Nightmare?
The baseline scenario depicted in Fig. 3 represents something close to a dream for 
regulators: a distressed bank that can be internally recapitalized in a going concern 
without adverse spillovers. No credibility issues, information asymmetries or any 
other external factors can threaten such a dreamlike environment. Nonetheless, as 
this section will show, the dreamlike resolution can turn into a nightmare even with-
out opting out of the assumptions designed in Sect. 5.1. It suffices to embed the rules 
stemming from competing policy goals (Sects.  4.3 and 4.4). In fact, in pursuing 
these competing goals, the Directive provides for an ‘external shielding’ mechanism 
which alters the incentive structure, resulting in the inherent dilution of incentives 
for monitoring.
Before discussing how the NCWO rules and the rules on public aid to failing 
banks alter the baseline scenario, it is important to stress, once again, the ontologi-
cal difference between the two sets of rules discussed in this section. In fact, ‘con-
tractual shielding’ rules imply that investors whose claim have different seniority 
will exert different levels of discipline. This only descends by the fact that the bor-
rowing bank has issued claims that are more junior than others, so that the level of 
privately efficient discipline only depends on the existence of other investors that are 
more directly exposed to losses. On the contrary, ‘external shielding’ rules imply 
that investors, despite their seniority, can reduce their exposure in the case of resolu-
tion via external mechanisms (i.e.: the counterfactual liquidation scenario and State 
intervention) so that other investors that are directly exposed to losses might not 
exist.
To appreciate the fundamental difference between the two categories of rules 
being considered, think of the simple numerical example described in Sect.  5.1: 
when only ‘contractual shielding’ rules are in place (the baseline scenario), the 
investor is facing losses in the case of resolution and can influence the probability of 
resolution if it engages in costly monitoring. If ‘external shielding’ rules play a role 
the situation might dramatically change. Think, for instance, of the same investor 
expecting to recover 25% of its exposure under normal liquidation because of any 
of the mechanisms discussed in Sect. 4.3. Now, the investor expects to bear losses 
of 75 in resolution and if the probability of resolution is 10%, the expected losses 
are 7.5. The investor still has to choose whether to engage in costly monitoring (at a 
cost of 2) to decrease the probability of resolution from 10 to 7.5%. Now, given the 
extra contractual expectation of being shielded via the NCWO principle, the exert-
ing monitoring is not rational for the investor, since the expected losses decrease to 
5.6 and the expected benefits stemming from monitoring are lower than its costs. It 
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is worth noting that whether the NCWO really applies is irrelevant; what is relevant 
is the reasonable expectation being partly shielded via the NCWO.156
5.2.1  No Creditor Worse Off
As discusses before, the NCWO principle imposes that a bail-in has to consist of an 
overall welfare-improving procedure from the creditors’ perspective. In stating this, 
the European legislator has aimed at protecting investors’ property rights, so as to 
comply with their constitutional rights.157 From the perspective of the investors this 
means that, despite the level of expected losses stemming from the resolution proce-
dure, they cannot bear actual losses that are greater than in the insolvency counter-
factual scenario. In another fashion: creditors foresee that they will be shielded from 
losses that exceed the losses expected under a normal liquidation procedure.
This affects the incentives of monitoring investors. In fact, investors are artifi-
cially shielded by future losses through a device (i.e.: the insolvency counterfactual 
scenario) that is conceptually opposite to the idea of market discipline and serves a 
different policy objective.
As Sect. 4.3 discussed, the concrete impact of the NCWO principle can derive 
from different channels, some of which are endogenous to resolution; namely the 
exemptions/exclusions under Article 44.158
The basic incentive structure has demonstrated that, under the assumption that 
investors are able to know ex ante which liabilities will be exempted and excluded 
from the bail-in procedure, they will be able to recalculate the expected losses they 
are going to incur. Nevertheless, those exemptions/exclusions hinge upon investors’ 
incentives through the NCWO principle, since they increase the spread between the 
investors’ treatment under the resolution procedure and in the alternative insolvency 
scenario.159
In Fig. 4, the NCWO conceptualization is added to the basic incentive structure 
of Fig. 3: the dashed line in the figure represents an example of such a conceptu-
alization, thus representing the amount of losses in the alternative insolvency sce-
nario. The example provides a fairly conservative approach, as both the AT1 and 
T2 instruments are assumed to bear full losses in the counterfactual insolvency sce-
nario. What is worth noticing is that if the dashed line (NCWO) intercepts the solid 
line (basic incentive) the expected losses are capped, consequently diluting incen-
tives to monitor. This is exemplified by the grey area ‘A’ in the figure.
158 Up to a certain extent, the same argument also holds true for theoretically eligible securities, which 
are issued by a third country which does not accept the contractual recognition under Art. 55. On the 
other hand, there are instances where the NCWO can play a role, such as an ex post clawback, which can-
not be anticipated at all even assuming ex ante perfect information.
159 In cases in which exemptions/exclusions would be treated differently under the two scenarios. This is, 
for instance, the case of Art. 44(3)(a) (a practical impossibility to implement the bail-in).
156 This can happen both ex ante, when applying the resolution tool, or ex post through compensation 
under Art. 75.
157 Valiante (2016); Wojcik (2016).
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To sum up, the NCWO can dilute incentives capping the bearable losses that 
creditors can incur under resolution. The channel through which this can concretely 
occur consists of the rules applied in resolution whose spillovers affect the counter-
factual insolvency scenario.
Fig. 4  Incentive structure of bail-inable creditors when the NCWO principle is in place
Fig. 5  Incentive structure of bail-inable creditors when the 8% threshold is in place
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5.2.2  The 8% Threshold
There is wide consensus among scholars concerning the fact that a governmen-
tal guarantee of banks’ solvency has not been eradicated once and for all with the 
BRRD. Indeed, as discussed back in Sect. 4.4, the BRRD itself recognizes the pos-
sibility of using public funds during resolution to prevent spillovers. Thus, even in 
the ideal setting plotted here, it is reasonable to expect public interventions once the 
legal conditions provided by the Directive are met; namely, there has been an 8% 
contribution by insiders.
From the investors’ perspective, this exogenously impacts their payoff structure, 
altering the level of losses they expect to bear. In a more concrete fashion, if the 
claim of investor A has seniority above the threshold of 8% of the total liabilities 
(including own funds), it can reasonably expect to be, at least partially, shielded by 
public intervention.
For such a process to occur, the assumption of a smooth market for bail-ina-
ble securities needs to be specified. In particular, investors need to have perfect 
information about whether their claim is junior or senior to the 8% of eligible 
liabilities out of the total amount of liabilities. This has two implications: first, 
the investors need to have perfect information on the capital structure of their 
borrower; second, they must have perfect information about exemptions/exclu-
sions of liabilities according to Article 44 and their impact in reaching the 8% 
threshold.
Figure  5, again, graphically depicts the situation. The 8% threshold has been 
assumed to fall at the end of T2 instruments. As expressed previously, the expecta-
tion to be shielded by public intervention lowers the expected losses. Hence, the 
graph highlights a discontinuity between the expected losses in the basic scenario 
(vertical line) and the resulting incentive if public intervention is expected. The grey 
areas ‘A’ and ‘B’ represent the incentive dilution corresponding to the public shield-
ing of senior investors.
To sum up, the flexibilities embedded in the BRRD generate a discontinuity in 
the incentive structure of the investors lying above or below the threshold of 8% of 
eligible liabilities out of the total liabilities. Indeed, creditors above such a threshold 
can reasonably expect to be bailed out. Moreover, if the precautionary recapitaliza-
tion detailed in Sect. 4.4 is considered, the threshold required for burden sharing can 
be lower than 8%, so that more investors can ex ante expect to be shielded by public 
intervention, worsening the ex ante incentives toward monitoring.
Finally, in terms of the effect of both the NCWO rules and the State intervention 
rules, the expected result is to lower the sensitivity of interest rates to the actual risk 
profile of the borrower, thereby decreasing the level of discipline imposed on man-
agers’ behaviour. Overall, both of the rules lower the expected losses of investors, so 
that the return on the investment (interest rate) required diminishes.160
160 It is important to note that this does not mean that the cost of funding for the bank has not increased 
after the BRRD entered into force, but that such an increase is not tightly linked to the behaviour of the 
individual bank, so that its discipline effect is limited.
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5.3  A Dream or a Nightmare: Where Will We Wake Up?
So far, Sect.  5 has speculated about an ideal environment where, having specific 
assumptions, it is possible to conclude that certain aspects of the legal design of the 
BRRD inherently impair incentives toward market discipline. In this way, the article 
has shown how a dream-like environment where resolution works smoothly can eas-
ily turn into a nightmare. Now it is time to wake up and come out of such a dream/
nightmare, assessing whether the theoretical speculation proposed can hold true in 
real life.
In other words, the question that still has to be answered is whether investors in 
bail-inable creditors are actually able to discount all the impediments that might 
stem from the legal framework and fully internalize the probability of future losses 
in their pricing.
Even though it is not possible to evaluate all the cases of resolution in light of 
the theory proposed so far, it is crucial to provide at least some anecdotal evidence 
showing the inability and/or unwillingness of investors to discount future losses.
Some cases, such as the resolution of Banco Popular and the precautionary 
recapitalization of Monte Paschi Bank, have already been briefly analysed and they 
support my findings.161 A further paradigmatic case of the inability of investors to 
ex ante discount future losses in pricing their bail-inable instruments has been pro-
vided by the investors in contingent convertible instruments162 issued by Deutsche 
Bank.163 Deutsche Bank reported losses for the fiscal year 2015 and, once the news 
became public, the price of its shares fell, eroding the capital position of the bank 
and coming close to breaching the so-called ‘combined buffer requirement’.164 
According to the incumbent regulation, if the capital ratio of a (still solvent) bank 
breaches such ‘combined buffer requirements’, then distributions of contingent con-
vertible instruments (i.e.: payment of the 6% coupon) can be cancelled, so that the 
investors somehow bear the costs of early distress. This is in line with the new phi-
losophy underpinning the resolution framework, i.e.: private sector involvement.165
The market panic that stemmed from the fear of missing a coupon testifies to the 
fact that investors did not internalize the probability of future losses on their invest-
ment. The price of the instruments dropped, losing almost 30% of their value in one 
161 A wider review of recent resolution cases can be found in Philippon and Salord (2017); World Bank 
Group (2016). For an up to date analysis of recent cases, see Ventoruzzo and Sandrelli (2019).
162 Contingent convertible instruments (Cocos) are bail-inable instruments that are also part of regula-
tory capital. In this case, they were part of Additional Tier 1 capital pursuant to Arts. 51 and 54 CRR.
163 An extensive description and analysis of the case can be found in Glasserman and Perotti (2018).
164 Arts. 131 and 141 of the Capital Requirement Directive (CRD IV) (Directive 2013/36/EU [2013] OJ 
L 176/338). The combined buffer requirements consist of normal minimum capital requirements (Art. 92 
CRR), institution-specific additional capital requirements (Art. 97 CRD IV) and additional buffers (Arts. 
131 et seq. CRD IV).
165 For more information on the underlying legal mechanisms and the ambiguities existing in EU law 
and supervisory practices, see Mesnard and Magnus (2016).
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month and recovering only after the regulator had intervened by exploiting a legal 
loophole for allowing a lawful distribution of the coupon in 2016.166
It is worth noting how skipping the payment of the coupon is a mild way of bear-
ing losses as opposed to a fully-fledged bail-in. Moreover, incumbent regulation as 
well as in the contractual term of the instrument clearly signalled such a contin-
gency. Yet, market participants were unable to discount such a possibility in pricing 
the instruments that they only react retrospectively once the problem has material-
ized, which is the exact opposite of what is expected from an effective market disci-
pline that should have preventive effects. This, anecdotally, confirms the soundness 
of the findings of the qualitative model developed in the previous sections.
6  Concluding Remarks
The article has tackled the long-lasting debates on the ability of creditors to disci-
pline banks’ behaviour. In doing so, the article has adopted the perspective of the 
post-crisis stream of reforms and the alleged alignment between the interests of bail-
inable debt holders and those of regulators/supervisors.
The rules shaping the market for bail-inable securities hinge upon features that 
are external to the status of investors under resolution (i.e.: a counter-factual insol-
vency situation; the possibility of granting public money to the bank). The analysis 
carried out in Sect. 5 showed that the overall outcome of these rules is to dilute the 
incentives to monitor banks’ risk-taking behaviour. Such an outcome stems from the 
shielding effects that specific external features impacted by the BRRD rules have on 
investors. In other words, as long as investors rationally expect to be shielded from 
losses thanks to mechanisms out of their contractual arrangements, the incentives to 
discipline the borrowing bank’s risk-taking behaviour will not be optimal.
It is worth noticing that the inherent dilution in incentive derives from the coex-
istence of a plurality of policy objectives. Indeed, all the features at stake, including 
creditors’ monitoring, shall be included, latu sensu, within the resolution objectives.
In fact, ‘maintaining market discipline’167 and ‘minimising reliance on extraordinary 
public financial support’ are expressly mentioned by Article 31(2). Whereas the protec-
tion of property rights can be considered to be an implicit part of those objectives as that 
represents a pillar of the legal system in itself, protected by national constitutions as well 
as at the European level.168 Even though the BRRD explicitly states that ‘the resolution 
167 Even though this research has made it clear that the word ‘maintaining’ associated with the concept 
of market discipline in the banking industry is, to say the least, misleading.
168 As enshrined by Art. 1, Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Whether or not the 
NCWO is an apt means to efficiently protect property rights falls beyond the scope of this research. On 
that see Tröger (2017) and Wojcik (2016).
166 The legal point was the stacking order of Pillar 2 requirements imposed by the supervisor. The new 
praxis is to differentiate between Pillar 2 requirements and Pillar 2 Guidance, where only the former are 
binding and count for breaching the ‘combined buffer requirements’. See, finally, EBA Guidelines on 
common procedures and methodologies for the supervisory review and evaluation process (SREP), EBA/
GL/2014/13, 19 July 2018.
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objectives are of equal significance’,169 the actual legal design and the foreseeable reso-
lution practice lean toward the primacy of the stability consideration. In a nutshell, the 
co-existence and the interplay of multiple policy goals addressed by the BRRD impede 
providing bail-inable creditors with optimal incentives to monitor their borrower.
Even though conflicting objectives in resolution have been seriously understud-
ied, it seems unreasonable that an alternative design could rectify the incentive dilu-
tion toward monitoring, at the same time allowing for the same level of flexibility 
and the protection of property rights. In the same vein, preserving financial stability 
and protecting property rights clearly outweigh market discipline in terms of mini-
mising resolution costs and avoiding the destruction of value.
In conclusion, it appears that the enthusiasm of the policymakers and some com-
mentators on the disciplining capacity of the new resolution framework has been 
misplaced, or at least overemphasized. In fact, even though little evidence of the 
actual behaviour of bail-inable creditors has so far been provided, expecting them 
to carry out an optimal level of monitoring and adjust the price of securities accord-
ingly is little more than a dream. Such an expectation is supported by neither theory 
nor current practice. Therefore, at least in the current regulatory framework, the 
effectiveness of a bail-in in preventing and addressing future crises cannot solely 
rely on the disciplining capacity of bail-inable creditors.
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Appendix: A Stylized Application of the NCWO Principle
The NCWO principle has been heavily criticized for its vagueness and complex-
ity170: beyond the appealing idea and the underlying rationales, it is difficult to grasp 
how it is supposed to work in a concrete fashion. Therefore, building on the previous 
169 Art. 31(3) BRRD. An identical provision can be found in the SRMR, Art. 14(3).
170 Tröger (2018), pp 36–38.
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legal analysis, it is useful to provide some easy and simplified numerical examples. 
This allows one to better understand how the NCWO principle alters the incentive 
structures of investors. Moreover, this example shows that the NCWO is not just a 
theoretical safeguard, but it can have a concrete impact on the resolution process and 
investors in bail-inable securities.
‘Bank A’ in normal times owns assets worth 100, wholly made up of loans. Bank 
A’s funding consists of capital, two layers of debt and deposits (Fig. 6—Panel 1). 
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the equity ratio (Total Assets/Equity) of 
Bank A is 8% of its total assets and it matches the regulatory requirements.
Baseline scenario (Panels 3 and 4) An idiosyncratic shock occurs and Bank A’s 
loans are now worth only 70, with a total amount of losses of 30 (Panel 2). Bank A 
is now failing and the resolution authority decides to apply the bail-in tool to restore 
a net asset value equal to zero and sufficient capital, in pursuance of Article 46.
In order to cover the losses capital holders are completely wiped out. Junior cred-
itors are then partly wiped out [22] so that the losses are fully covered and partly 
converted into new equity [3]. Moreover, senior claims are partly converted into 
equity [3] to restore the appropriate level of regulatory capital (Panel 3). In this case, 
Fig. 6  Application of the NCWO to the stylized balance sheet of Bank A
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no creditor is worse off, as in the counterfactual scenario of liquidation both deposi-
tors and senior creditors fully recover their investments and junior creditors have a 
recovery rate of 12%.171 In such a situation the NCWO has no impact on the resolu-
tion process and, hence, on investors’ ex ante incentives, as shown in Fig. 7.
Let us now consider two alternatives in which the scenario depicted so far is 
altered. The first alternative scenario implies that during the liquidation proce-
dure liabilities are clawed back; the second considers the case in which some of 
the liabilities are considered to be ineligible by the resolution authority, for any of 
the reasons provided by Article 44(2) and (3). The main difference between those 
two scenarios is that in the first the assessment of the counter-factual liquidation 
changes, while in the second what changes is the bail-in outcome.
Clawback Scenario (Panel 5) During the liquidation procedure, the Court orders 
the clawback of capital whose value is 5. Imagine, for instance, that the directors 
have unlawfully distributed dividends at a time of financial distress instead of 
increasing the bank’s reserves. This alters the counterfactual liquidation scenario 
since the amount of distributable assets increases accordingly and junior creditors 
recover a larger share of their investment, with a recovery rate of 32%. In this sce-
nario, junior creditors are worse off, as depicted in Panel 3. Figure 8 shows that 
junior creditors suffer higher losses under a bail-in than under liquidation. Thus, 
they are entitled to compensation pursuant to Article 75 BRRD.
Non-eligible liabilities scenario (Panel 6) For any of the reasons listed in Article 
44(2) and (3), the resolution authority decides that a fraction of the junior debt 
[15] cannot be bailed-in. This can happen for a wide number of reasons. Imagine 
junior securities issued under the law of a third country that is not promptly bail-
inable, or the even more compelling case in which the exempted junior liabilities 
are held by a distressed bank that cannot bear such losses without becoming fail-
ing. In this situation, for covering the losses [30], both capital [8] and the part of 
the eligible junior debts left [10] are wiped out. Moreover, a part of the senior 
debt is wiped out as well [12] to cover the remaining losses and the other part is 
converted into equity [5]. Finally, to restore the regulatory capital, the Deposit 
Guarantee Scheme has to step in and make a subrogated contribution under Arti-
cle 109(1)(a). In fact, there are no other eligible liabilities: thus, the Deposit 
Guarantee Scheme is liable for the amount by which covered deposits would have 
been written down (Fig. 9).
Figure 9 shows that both junior and senior creditors suffer higher losses under a 
bail-in than under liquidation. Thus, they are both entitled to compensation pursu-
ant to Article 75 BRRD. Moreover, since covered depositors would have incurred 
losses, the Deposit Guarantee Scheme has to step into bear such losses, so that the 
array of actors involved in the bail-in process is larger under these circumstances.
171 This is subject to the assumption that the debt-equity swap follows the rate of conversion of 1:1. The 
amount of converted capital remains approximately 8% of the total assets.
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Fig. 7  Level of losses under the bail-in and liquidation regime in the baseline scenario
Fig. 8  Level of losses under the bail-in and liquidation regime in the clawback scenario
Fig. 9  Level of losses under the bail-in and liquidation regime in the non-eligible liabilities scenario
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